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Abstract
I explore the logic of the conditional, using credence judgments to argue against
Duality and in favor of Conditional Excluded Middle. I then explore how to give a
theory of the conditional which validates the latter and not the former, developing a
variant on Kratzer (1981)’s restrictor theory, as well as a proposal which combines
Stalnaker (1968)’s theory of the conditional with the theory of epistemic modals
I develop in Mandelkern 2019a. I argue that the latter approach fits naturally with
a conception of conditionals as referential devices which allow us to talk about
particular worlds.
Keywords: logic of conditionals; Duality; Conditional Excluded Middle; probabilities of
conditionals
1 Introduction
This paper begins with ‘a detail in the semantics of the conditional’ (Stalnaker 1980):
the status of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM), which says that ‘If p, q or if
p, not q’ is always true. CEM is in tension with another principle, Duality, which
says that ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, might not q’ are contradictories. I argue that when we
focus on credence judgments, rather than assertability or disagreement judgments,
it becomes clear that Duality is false; these judgments also provide further support
for CEM. The main theory of conditionals which validates the latter and not the
former is that of Stalnaker 1968. I argue that Stalnaker’s theory, together with his
proposal about how to interpret ‘might’-conditionals from Stalnaker 1980, cannot
make sense of conditionals with complex modal consequents. Such conditionals
provide natural motivation for a restrictor approach along the lines of Lewis 1975,
* Thanks to audiences at Arché, MIT, Princeton, Ulster University, and UCL; and to Itai Bassi, David
Boylan, Fabrizio Cariani, Bruno Jacinto, Joshua Knobe, Daniel Rothschild, Paolo Santorio, Ginger
Schultheis, and Robbie Williams for very helpful discussion; special thanks to Cian Dorr for extensive
discussion and suggestions.
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Kratzer 1981. Standard versions of that approach validate Duality, not Conditional
Excluded Middle; I explore an alternative version which validates the latter, not the
former. Then I discuss some drawbacks of that approach, and revisit the Stalnakerian
theory, arguing that it can make sense of ‘might’-conditionals after all, provided we
take a suitably sophisticated approach to the meaning of ‘might’. I argue, finally,
that this latter approach fits naturally with a conception of conditionals as referential
devices which allow us to talk about particular (possibly distal) worlds; and, more
generally, with a unified approach to reference to individuals, times, and worlds,
along the lines advocated by Schlenker (2004, 2006).
2 CEM and Duality
I begin by reviewing the controversy over CEM and Duality. I use ‘If p, q’ to range
over conditionals, both indicative and subjunctive; what I say is meant to apply
to both.1 CEM, again, says that ‘If p, q or if p, not q’ is always true—thus, for
instance, that ‘If you flip the coin, it will land heads, or if you flip the coin, it will
land tails’ is true no matter what. Duality says that ‘If p, not q’ and ‘If p, might q’
are contradictories, i.e., that exactly one of them is always true; thus e.g. that if ‘The
coin will land heads if flipped’ is true, then ‘The coin might land tails if it is flipped’
is false, and vice versa.
CEM and Duality are jointly consistent, but they cannot plausibly both be true.
Suppose they were, and suppose that ‘If p, might q’ is true. Then by Duality, it
would follow that ‘If p, not q’ is false; by CEM, it would follow that ‘If p, q’ is true
(making classical assumptions about the Boolean connectives). So then ‘If p, might
q’ would entail ‘If p, q’. But this cannot be right. ‘If Matt flipped the coin, it might
have landed heads’ does not entail ‘If Matt flipped the coin, it landed heads’.
This creates a puzzle, because both CEM and Duality are prima facie attractive.
Consider first the case for CEM. First, negated disjunctions ‘Not (if p, q, or if p, not
q)’ (equivalently, ‘Not (if p, q) and not (if p, not q)’) strike us as odd. Even Lewis
(1973), who argues against CEM, concedes that a sentence like (1) sounds like a
contradiction:
1 I use quotation marks for both quotes and corner quotes.
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(1) It is not the case that if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be
Italian; and it is not the case that if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet
would not be Italian.
As Lewis notes, the oddness of (1) can be brought out by following it up with
‘Nevertheless, if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet either would or would not
be Italian’, which is surely true.
(1) is, however, a somewhat artificial construction, since wide-scope negation
over conditionals is not particularly natural. A second, and perhaps more compelling,
argument for CEM comes from Higginbotham (1986, 2003), who observes that
conditionals under quantifiers behave in a way that conforms to CEM. For instance,
note that (2a) and (2b) strike us as equivalent:2
(2) a. No one passed if they goofed off.
b. Everyone failed if they goofed off.
Assume that passing and failing are contradictories, and that sentences like (2a) and
(2b) have the logical forms they seem to have: that is, they comprise quantifiers
taking scope over open conditionals, as in (3):3
(3) a. No x (x passed if x goofed off).
b. Every x (x failed if x goofed off).
How can we predict that (2a) and (2b) are equivalent, as they seem to be? That (2b)
entails (2a) is predicted on any reasonable theory. What about the other direction?
The validity of the inference from (2a) to (2b) follows immediately if CEM is valid.
By the standard semantics for ‘No’, ‘No x (x passed if x goofed off)’ is true just in
case ‘Every x (Not: x passed if x goofed off)’ is true. If CEM is valid, ‘Not: x passed
if x goofed off’ entails ‘x failed if x goofed off’. And so ‘No x (x passed if x goofed
off)’ entails ‘Every x (x failed if x goofed off)’, as desired.
2 We can also look at conditional under negative attitude verbs like ‘doubt’, as Cariani & Santorio
(2018) suggest (in a different context) and Cariani & Goldstein (2018) suggest in arguing for CEM.
3 See von Fintel & Iatridou 2002 for motivation for this assumption. One way to circumvent any
complexities concerning the structure of such sentences is to look at exchanges like: ‘Of which
students is it true that they [passed/failed] if they goofed off?’ The answers ‘None’ and ‘All’ to the
two questions, respectively, feel equivalent, an observation with the same upshot as Higginbotham’s.
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By contrast, if Duality, instead of CEM, is true, then ‘Not: x passed if x goofed
off’ is equivalent to ‘x might not have passed if x goofed off’. But then (2a) is
predicted to be equivalent, not to (2b), but rather to (4):
(4) Everyone might have failed if they goofed off.
But this is wrong: (2a) and (4) are not equivalent. To make this concrete, imagine a
classroom where Teacher promised the students that, if a student goofed off, Teacher
would flip a coin: if it landed heads, the student would pass; if tails, the student
will fail. Now suppose we don’t know what actually happened. In this scenario, it
seems like we know (4) to be true, but we don’t know (2a) to be true; so these are
inequivalent, contrary to the predictions of Duality, but in line with the predictions
of CEM.
These points are robust across different kinds of conditionals, including both in-
dicative and subjunctive conditionals; thus, for instance, (5a) strikes us as equivalent
to (5b), not (5c); likewise for (6):
(5) a. No student will pass if they goof off.
b. = Every student will fail if they goof off.
c. 6= Every student might fail if they goof off.
(6) a. No one would have passed if they had goofed off.
b. = Everyone would have failed if they had goofed off.
c. 6= Everyone might have failed if they had goofed off.
In general, then, ‘No x (if p(x), q(x))’ looks equivalent to ‘Every x (if p(x), not
q(x))’, not to ‘Every x (if p(x), might not q(x))’. This is predicted by CEM, but is
inconsistent with Duality. This provides powerful motivation for CEM.4
But, while this case for CEM is compelling, there is also a case to be made for
Duality. One motivation for Duality comes from facts about disagreement and co-
assertability: speakers who assert sentences of the form ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, might not
q’ are felt to be in disagreement with each other, and it is generally infelicitous for a
4 Leslie (2009) argues against this conclusion; see Klinedinst (2011) for a response. Again, ques-
tion/answer pairs like those discussed in Footnote 3 let us make this same point while circumventing
some of the relevant structural complexity. See Huitink (2009), Kratzer (In Press) for further discus-
sion of quantified conditionals.
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single speaker to assert both of these. Thus Bob and Sue are felt to be disagreeing in
(7) and (8):
(7) a. [Bob:] If the coin was flipped, it landed heads.
b. [Sue:] No! If the coin was flipped, it might have landed tails.
(8) a. [Bob:] If the coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads.
b. [Sue:] No! If the coin had been flipped, it might have landed tails.
Likewise, an assertion of a sentence like (9) or (10) is felt to be quite odd:
(9) #If the coin was flipped, it landed heads; and if the coin was flipped, it might
have landed tails.
(10) #If the coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads; and if the coin had
been flipped, it might have landed tails.
These facts about disagreement and co-assertability are, again, robust across different
kinds of conditionals; and they are, of course, immediately explained if ‘If p, not q’
and ‘If p, might q’ are contradictories, as Duality holds.
The second argument for Duality is more abstract. The argument is that Duality
gives us a nice characterization of the meaning of ‘If p, might q’: according to
Duality, this just is the negation of ‘If p, not q’. Lewis (1973) argues that there is
no other natural way to account for intuitions about the meaning of conditionals
with this form. This idea gained support from Kratzer (1981, 1986)’s influential
restrictor semantics for the conditional. The key idea, which we will explore in
more detail shortly, is that ‘if’-clauses serve to restrict a modal in the consequent
of conditionals. When no overt modal is present, Kratzer assumes there is a covert
‘must’. Given the consensus that ‘must’ and ‘might’ are themselves duals, Duality
falls out immediately from the restrictor approach.
In addition to arguments for CEM and Duality, there are a number of important
arguments against them in the literature. I will not survey the extant arguments
against Duality here; I am largely in sympathy with them, and will be adding my
own in the next section. Since I will be defending CEM, though, it is important to
acknowledge the main argument against CEM, which is based on the observation
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that it often feels as though neither ‘If p, q’ nor ‘If p, not q’ is true. This is the case,
for instance, with Quine’s famous pair:
(11) If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian.
(12) If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would not be Italian.
Neither of these is obviously true. CEM predicts that their disjunction is clearly true,
from which it is a short step to the counterintuitive claim that at least one of (11)
or (12) is true. But there are ways to either block this step, or else become more
comfortable with it. Stalnaker (1980) showed that we can block this step given a
supervaluationist account of the indeterminacy of conditionals. On such an account,
p is true simpliciter just in case p is true according to every admissible valuation;
false simpliciter just in case false at every admissible valuation; and otherwise
indeterminate. Then it could be that both (11) and (12) are indeterminate, and thus
fail to be true (or false) simpliciter; but their disjunction nonetheless will always
true simpliciter. Hawthorne 2005 argues that we can make the counterintuitive claim
that one of (11) and (12) is true more palatable, by building on an epistemicist
approach to vagueness (Williamson 1994), and holding that one of these conditionals
is always true—we just don’t (and perhaps can’t) know which. I will not explore these
avenues in detail, or try to choose between them, though I should note that the latter
approach looks easier to square with the fact that we have determinate probability
judgments about many conditionals which would plausibly be indeterminate on a
supervaluationist approach. Having said that, my main point here is that there are
at least prima facie reasonable paths of response available to defenders of CEM in
response to this obvious concern.5
5 Lewis pushes a more abstract version of this objection: in his semantic framework, CEM commits us
to similarity orderings on worlds being well-orders, which is metaphysically implausible. But this
worry seems wrongheaded: if natural language demands that the relevant orderings have a certain
structure, then we should follow its lead, and then figure out how best to intuitively characterize the
orderings in question, rather than letting our intuitions about metaphysics dictate our semantics. See
§7 for further discussion of this point. Among other things, CEM commits us to the Limit assumption,
which cannot be straightforwardly defused with supervaluations or epistemicism (though see Swanson
2012). Again, Limit feels metaphysically implausible; but, again, from the point of view of logic and
language, Limit is very natural: as Herzberger (1979) observes, the assumption is equivalent to the
very plausible claim that, for any p, if ‘If p, q’ is true for all q in some set of sentences Γ, then Γ must
be consistent provided p is possible. Again, I think we should let intuitions about language and logic
drive our model theory, rather than vice versa.
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What is the present standing of CEM and Duality in the literature? My impression
is that Duality tends to come out ahead. Among linguists, Kratzer’s Duality-friendly
theory is dominant, and it has become increasingly popular among philosophers in
recent years as well; prominent alternatives given by linguists, like von Fintel (1997,
2001)’s dynamic strict conditional, likewise invalidate CEM. Among philosophers
since Stalnaker, while some arguments for CEM and against Duality have been
mounted, this stance seems to remain a minority position: Cariani & Goldstein
(2018), in defending CEM, characterize it as a ‘conditional heresy’; Williams (2010)
writes: ‘Folklore. . .has treated [CEM] as the clear loser in the face of Lewis’s ‘might’
arguments’; in a memorable turn of phrase, van Fraassen (1976) describes CEM as
‘the peculiar Stalnaker principle first denied by Lewis’.6
How do philosophers and linguists who invalidate CEM account for the data
which seem to speak in its favor, like Higginbotham’s conditionals? The main line
of response is due to von Fintel 1997. Von Fintel argues that, in a wide range of
domains (modal and otherwise), covert universal quantification comes paired with
a homogeneity assumption (see Schlenker 2004, Križ 2015, Cariani & Goldstein
2018 for recent discussion): in a quantificational structure pQ(p)(q)q, where ‘Q’
is a covert quantifier, there is a going assumption that all the relevant p-things
are alike with respect to q—either they are all q, or they are all q. We assume a
Kratzerian/Lewisian theory on which bare conditionals (conditionals without an
overt modal or conditional in the consequent) contain a covert universal modal (more
on this shortly). Then ‘If p, q’ will come along with a homogeneity assumption
which, when satisfied, will guarantee that ‘If p, q or if p, not q’ is true. ‘If p, q or
if p, not q’ won’t always be true, for the homogeneity assumption won’t always be
satisfied. But in the cases in which it’s not, the conditional will not be assertable,
and so CEM will always seem to be true in cases in which we actually contemplate
conditionals. The promise of this kind of approach is that it can account for all the
CEM-friendly data we’ve seen, while also validating Duality, without collapsing ‘If
6 For pro-CEM/anti-Duality views, see e.g. Stalnaker 1984, McGee 1985, DeRose 1994, Heller 1995,
DeRose 1999, Weatherson 2001, Cross 2009, Williams 2010, Swanson 2012, Klinedinst 2011,
Rothschild 2013, Cariani & Goldstein 2018. For anti-CEM/pro-Duality views, besides Lewis’s and
Kratzer’s, see e.g. Bennett 1974, Groenendijk et al. 1996, Bennett 2003, Gillies 2004, 2007, Yalcin
2007, Williams 2008, Gillies 2010, 2009, Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010, Starr 2014, Stojnic´ 2016,
Holliday & Icard 2017, Santorio 2018.
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p, might q’ to ‘If p, q’. Something along these lines seems to me to be the best way
to stand strong against CEM and in favor of Duality.
3 Credences
But this approach is not satisfying. For while facts about assertability and dis-
agreement provide prima facie motivation for Duality, when we turn our attention
to graded judgments about conditionals, it becomes quite clear, I will argue, that
Duality is not valid.7
Suppose that Mark is holding a fair coin. He has his back to us. We see some
motion, but are not sure what has happened. Jane says the following:
(13) [Jane:] If Mark flipped the coin, it landed heads.
Now suppose you and I are talking about what Jane said. I ask: ‘What do you think
of what Jane said? What is the probability that what she said is true?’ If you are like
most respondents, you will say that there is a .5 chance that what Jane said is true.
Now suppose that Steve says the following:
(14) [Steve:] If Mark flipped the coin, it might have landed tails.
Now I ask you: ‘What do you think of what Steve said? What is the probability that
it is true?’ If you are like most respondents, you will say that there is a very good
chance that it is true: it is something we can be certain, or nearly certain of. In other
words, (14) has a chance of being true somewhere near 1.
We can elicit similar judgments with counterfactuals. Suppose that Mark is
holding a fair coin, but doesn’t flip it. Now consider the following:
(15) [Jack:] If Mark had flipped the coin, it would have landed heads.
(16) [Sue:] If Mark had flipped the coin, it might have landed tails.
7 Dorr & Hawthorne (2018) independently make essentially the same argument. Similar credence
arguments have been made in a corresponding debate about future contingents (Prior 1976, Belnap
et al. 2001, Cariani & Santorio 2018). See Edgington 1986, DeRose 1994, Eagle 2007 for closely
related but different credence arguments concerning conditionals. DeRose’s argument goes by way of
judgments about assertability rather than credence judgments; Eagle’s involves conditionals which
embed ‘would’ and ‘might’ under ‘likely’, which raise complexities which the present argument
avoids (and is more open to the kind of Kratzerian response I consider below).
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What is the chance that what Jack said is true? Most people say it has a .5 chance of
being true. What is the chance that what Sue said is true? Most people say that it has
a chance near 1 of being true.
With these judgments in mind, let me turn to my argument against Duality.
According to Duality, (13) and (14) are contradictories: each is equivalent to the
negation of the other (assuming for simplicity that heads and tails are the only
possible outcomes of a flip). Likewise, according to Duality, (15) and (16) are
contradictories. Assuming that credences are well-modeled by a probability function,
rational credence in p and rational credence in p necessarily sum to 1. Then it
follows that if you assign .5 credence to (13), you must assign .5 credence to (14).
Conversely, if you assign credence near 1 to (14), you must assign credence near 0
to (13). Likewise, mutatis mutandis, for (15) and (16). In short: Duality rules out as
irrational the credence assignment that nearly everyone takes to be rational in these
cases. And so Duality is starkly at odds with our intuitive credence judgments about
conditionals.
Let me consider some responses to this argument. A first response is to challenge
the judgments. But these judgments are those of the vast majority of people. And they
seem robust under reflection: the cases in question are simple (they do not involve
complex reasoning of any kind), and informants do not seem at all inclined to revise
their judgments on further reflection (unlike in cases of well-known probabilistic
fallacies, where informants generally change their judgments once they see an error
in their reasoning). Moreover, since Duality predicts these credence judgments to
be impermissible, all I need for my argument against Duality is that it is rationally
permissible to have the judgments I have elicited here; I do not need the stronger
claim that this is rationally required. Such a weak claim seems hard to challenge.
In conversation, some have suggested to me that they can access the intuition that
your credence in (13)/(15) should be 0 (stressing ‘would’ in the latter helps). But I
do not think it can be maintained that this is rationally required. One way to see this
is to compare the present case to one in which Mark flips a coin which we know is
double-tailed. In that situation, it is clear that you are rationally required to have 0
credence in (13)/(15). But that case is intuitively very different from our case, where
we know that the coin in question is fair; this contrast helps make clear the intuition
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that, in our case, it is perfectly permissible to have credence around .5 in (13) and
(15).
A second response is to argue that rational credence does not obey the rule that
credence in a proposition and its complement should sum to 1. To maintain Duality,
we would have to accept in particular that rational credence in a proposition and in its
complement can sum to more than 1; this does not seem like a plausible response.8
A third response pursues a broadly Kratzerian error theory about the judgments
in question (see especially Kratzer 1986, Bennett 2003: p. 251, Egré & Cozic 2011,
Kratzer 2012, Rothschild In press). The idea would be that the judgments in question
are perfectly rational, but they are not judgments about what they appear to be about.
For instance, when subjects say that (13) has a .5 chance of being true, what they are
actually judging is that the following sentence is true:
(17) If Mark flipped the coin, there is a .5 chance that it landed heads.
And thinking that (17) is true, the thought would be, does not commit speakers to
thinking that (13) has a .5 chance of being true.
But this does not seem like a plausible response. I was careful in formulating
the questions about probability above not to make them questions about whether
sentences like (17) were true, but rather to make them questions about the probability
of what Mark/Jane/Jack/Sue said being true. It’s very natural that these judgments go
together—that the probability of (13) being true is .5 just in case (17) is true. This is
something I can happily take on board. By contrast, the error theory we’re considering
here must deny exactly this assumption: it must maintain that (17) is true, but deny
that the probability of (13) is .5 (or else likewise, mutatis mutandis, for (14)). This
seems a very uncomfortable position to be in. One way to maintain such a disconnect
would be to claim that we cannot even really think about the probability of a
conditional; all we can think about is the truth or falsity of probabilistic conditionals.
But this is a very strange thought; and, again, I do not know of any evidence for it.
It’s important to be clear that the error theory we are countenancing as a response
here is a much deeper error theory than one Bennett (2003) goes in for, on which
speakers who say ‘There is an n chance that, if p, then q’ in fact mean ‘If p, then
8 One motivation for this kind of position could come from non-classical logics; see Williams (2012),
Hedden (2013) for discussion. That motivation, however, does not seem particularly relevant or
helpful to the defender of Duality.
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there is an n chance that q’. That is a relatively mild error theory, on which judgments
about the truth of one sentence are mistaken for judgments about the truth of another
sentence, closely related to the first by movement of a probability operator; this sort
of error theory fits naturally with a Kratzerian vantage point on conditionals, and
seems plausible enough. But much more than this is required to account for the
present judgments: what is needed is the much stronger, and I think less plausible,
error theory which says that judgments about the probability of one sentence are
confused for judgments about the truth of a different sentence, one related to the first
only by the addition of an operator absent in the first.
Absent a more convincing response, we should conclude, then, that Duality
isn’t true. Binary phenomena like assertability and disagreement make Duality look
attractive. But graded judgments show that Duality runs counter to clear intuitions
about rational credence in conditionals.
Credence judgments provide not just an argument against Duality, but also
further support for CEM. Consider pairs like the following in a set-up as above:
(18) a. [Jane:] If Mark flipped the coin, it landed heads.
b. [Luke:] If Mark flipped the coin, it landed tails.
As we saw above, it seems clear that your credence in what Jane says should be .5.
By perfectly parallel reasoning, your credence in what Luke says should also be .5.
Parallel considerations go for the counterfactual variants in (19):
(19) a. [Jack:] If Mark had flipped the coin, it would have landed heads.
b. [Sue:] If Mark had flipped the coin, it would have landed tails.
Now keep focusing on pairs like those in (18) and (19), but change the coin from
a fair coin to a weighted one. If the coin is weighted in favor of heads at a ratio,
say, of 2:1, then what should your credence be in the conditionals of each pair?
Intuitively, 23 and
1
3 , respectively. What if it is weighted in favor of tails at a ratio of
5:4? Then your credence should be 59 and
4
9 , respectively. And so on. The important
thing here is that, in every case, rational credence in the pair of conditionals sums to
1. That, of course, is precisely what CEM predicts (assuming that rational credence
in a proposition and in its complement always sum to 1), since CEM predicts that, in
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every case, the disjunction of the two conditionals is a logical truth.9 So credence
judgments provide further inductive support for CEM.10
4 Stalnaker’s semantics
Credence judgments thus show Duality to be false, and they provide further inductive
support for CEM. Given this, we are on the market for a theory of the conditional
that invalidates Duality and validates CEM. The task of the remainder of the paper
will be exploring theories that fit the bill. I will begin by critically examining the
locus classicus (and, essentially, the only extant contender)11 for such an approach,
namely that of Stalnaker 1968, Stalnaker & Thomason 1970, Stalnaker 1980.
Stalnaker’s semantics says that ‘If p, q’ is true just in case q is true at the closest
world where p is. Stalnaker makes this precise using the formal mechanism of
selection functions; I will present things in an equivalent way using the apparatus
of order functions <(·) which take worlds to well-orders on worlds, representing
comparative similarity of worlds relative to a given world.12 We stipulate that the
minimal element of <(w) is always w (i.e., w is strictly more similar to w than any
other world). Then, where MIN<(w),p is the minimal world w′ according to <(w)
such that JpK<,w′= 1:13
Stalnaker semantics: JIf p, qK<,w=JqK<,MIN<(w),p
9 And the two conditionals are jointly incompatible on any reasonable theory, given the consistency of
the antecedents.
10 Santorio (2017) corrals this inductive evidence into a stronger argument for CEM, by showing that a
probabilistic form of CEM follows from Stalnaker (1970)’s thesis that the probability of a conditional
goes by way of the probability of its consequent on its antecedent—a thesis which cannot always
hold (Lewis 1976), but seems to hold in a wide range of cases (see Douven 2015 for discussion of
recent empirical motivation).
11 Cf. the approach of McGee 1985, which differs from Stalnaker only in ways that go beyond our
interest in this paper.
12 A well-order is a well-founded linear order, i.e. an order which is total, anti-symmetric, and transitive,
and which is such that any subset has a least member—e.g., the standard ordering on the positive
integers.
13 If there is no such world, then we let the minimal world be an absurd world λ which makes every
sentence true. I use italic letters to stand for the proposition expressed by the corresponding Roman
sentence letter, suppressing relativization to an order function for brevity; likewise throughout, mutatis
mutandis. As usual I will leave off the world superscript to indicate abstraction over worlds, e.g.JpK= λw′.JpKw′ .
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The first thing to note about Stalnaker’s semantics is that it validates CEM. A
conditional ‘If p, q’ is true iff the minimal p-world is a q-world. If it is, ‘If p, q’ is
true; if not, then the closest p-world must instead be a q-world, and so ‘If p, not q’ is
true instead—guaranteeing that the disjunction of the two is always true.
What about Duality? To assess this we have to say more about how we interpret
‘might’ in the consequent of a conditional. The most obvious option is to interpret it
in situ. Then ‘If p, might q’ will mean: the closest p-world is one where ‘Might q’
is true. But, as many, including Stalnaker (1980), have observed, this won’t work.
A quick way to see this is the following. Stalnaker’s semantics validates Strong
Centering: if p and q are both true, then so is ‘If p, q’. Now suppose that Mark is
about to flip a coin, but we don’t know the outcome. Then ‘It might land tails’ is
true. Suppose in fact that Mark will flip the coin, and it will land heads; so ‘The
coin will land heads’ is true (but we don’t know it). Then ‘If the coin lands heads, it
might land tails’ is predicted to be true, if we interpret the ‘might’ in situ. But this
does not sound true; indeed, it sounds like the kind of thing that cannot be true. So
we cannot flatfootedly interpret ‘might’ in situ in Stalnaker’s conditional.
A natural way of making sense of the infelicity of sentences like ‘If the coin lands
heads, it might land tails’ is to say that the ‘might’ is scoping over the conditional
‘If the coin lands heads, it will land tails’, which would straightforwardly account
for its infelicity. This is exactly what Stalnaker (1980) proposes: he argues that, in
general, when ‘might’ is in the consequent of a conditional, we interpret it as taking
wide-scope over the corresponding bare conditional. That is, ‘If p, might q’ has the
logical form ‘Might (if p, q)’.
This approach generally gives natural truth conditions for ‘might’-conditionals
(see DeRose 1994, 1999 for discussion and defense). And it has two important
upshots for Duality. First, ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, might not q’ are not predicted to be
contradictories. Instead, these stand to each other roughly as do p and ‘Might not
p’, which are not contradictories on any reasonable theory of ‘might’. So Duality
is invalid—as desired. But, crucially, Stalnaker’s theory still explains the data that
motivated Duality. For, given natural assumptions about ‘might’, p and ‘Might not
p’, despite being jointly consistent, are felt to be in disagreement with each other,
and are not co-assertable, for familiar, broadly Moorean reasons: asserting the first
expresses that the speaker knows p; asserting the second expresses that she does
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not.14 So, despite invalidating Duality, Stalnaker still has the resources to make
sense of the motivation for it.
I am sympathetic with the spirit of this line on ‘might’ conditionals. But the
details, I believe, are not viable. Problems come from conditionals with complex
consequents. Consider in particular a conditional with a ‘might’ which scopes over
part but not all of the consequent. Abstractly, the problem is that we cannot wide-
scope the ‘might’ over the whole conditional, since part of the consequent must
intuitively escape its scope. More concretely, suppose I hear a crash from the next
room, and I suspect that John has knocked over a vase which Sue really loves, but
which I suspect Mark rather doesn’t like. I can truly say the following:
(20) If John broke the vase, then Sue will be furious, but Mark might be happy.
On the most flat-footed implementation of Stalnaker’s theory of ‘might’ conditionals,
the ‘might’ which appears superficially in the consequent in fact takes scope (at
the relevant level of semantic computation) over the whole conditional, so (20) is
predicted to have the logical form (21):
(21) It might be that (if John broke the vase, then Sue will be furious, but Mark
will be happy).
The problem is that (21) and (20) are obviously not equivalent: (21) feels much
weaker. In particular, (20) communicates that I am sure Sue will be furious if John
broke the vase, whereas (21) does not communicate this at all.
A natural response would be to maintain that (20) has the logical form of two
conjoined conditionals, as in (22):
(22) If John broke the vase, then Sue will be furious, and it might be that, if John
broke the vase, Mark will be happy.
This line of response, however, runs aground on slightly more complicated cases—
in particular cases in which proportional quantifiers take scope over a complex
consequent. Suppose that an NGO is considering finding plaintiffs to file suit against
a tobacco company, but hasn’t actually found any plaintiffs yet. Based on the group’s
strategy for finding plaintiffs, we know that, if a suit went forward, a third of the
14 Actually, there has to be more to the story than this: see §6 for further discussion.
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plaintiffs would win outright, a third would lose outright, and a final third would not
win outright, but might get a settlement. In this case (23) seems true:
(23) If a suit were filed, then most of the plaintiffs either would win or might get
a settlement.
Now note that ‘most of the plaintiffs’ has to be interpreted in the consequent of the
conditional, since the plaintiffs exist only under the supposition that a suit is filed:
there are not yet actual plaintiffs (so we cannot coherently wide-scope the nominal
quantifier, as in ‘Most of the plaintiffs are such that, if a suit were filed, then they
either would win or might get a settlement’). So how do we extend a Stalnakerian
line to (23)? The first option is to say that ‘might’ takes wide scope over everything,
as in (24):
(24) It might be that (if a suit were filed, then most of the plaintiffs either would
win or would get a settlement).
But (24) is weaker than (23). For instance, consider a scenario in which, if a suit were
filed, a third of the plaintiffs might win, but also might not win, and definitely won’t
get a settlement; the second third might get a settlement, but definitely wouldn’t win;
and the final third definitely wouldn’t win or get a settlement. In that scenario, it
strikes me that we clearly know that (24) is true, whereas we do not know that (23)
is true. So these don’t mean the same thing.
A second option, recapitulating the response above, is to say that (23) is equiva-
lent to the following disjunction of conditionals:
(25) If a suit were filed, then most of the plaintiffs would win, or it might be that
if a suit were filed, then most of the plaintiffs would get a settlement.
The problem, of course, is that (25) is clearly not equivalent to (23): the proportional
quantifier in the consequent gums up this strategy. In our initial scenario, where (23)
was true, (25) is clearly false: it’s neither the case that most of the plaintiffs would
win (two-thirds would certainly not win); nor is it the case that it might be that most
of the plaintiffs get a settlement (two thirds certainly will not get a settlement). So
(25) and (23) do not mean the same thing.
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5 The restrictor analysis
Stalnaker’s strategy for interpreting ‘might’ conditionals thus runs into trouble from
conditionals with suitably complex consequents. We need a sensible way to interpret
‘might’ in situ. There is a theory of conditionals that is explicitly designed to account
for the interaction of ‘if’-clauses with overt modals: namely, the restrictor theory.
Starting with the work of Lewis 1975, developed by Kratzer 1981, 1986, research
in this tradition has argued that the role of ‘if’-clauses is to restrict the domains of
modals in the consequent of conditionals: when there is no overt modal, we assume
there is a covert modal. This seems to be exactly the sort of framework we need to
deal with the cases above. As I mentioned above, the standard development of the
restrictor analysis, in Kratzer 1981, validates Duality and not CEM. In this section, I
will introduce Kratzer’s theory and show how we can modify it to validate CEM and
not Duality.15 In the next section, I’ll return to Stalnaker’s theory and explore more
sophisticated avenues for interpreting epistemic modals in situ in the context of his
theory.
On Kratzer’s approach, sentences are evaluated relative to two parameters, one
which provides a set of worlds, and one which orders those worlds.16 The first
parameter is a modal base function f which takes any world to a set of worlds which
includes that world; the second is an order function (·) which takes any world to
partial pre-order on all worlds, with the property that for any world w, w is minimal
in(w) (we also make the simplifying assumption that(w) is well-founded). Then
Kratzer’s semantics for ‘if’-clauses goes as follows:
Kratzer ‘if’: JIf p, qK f ,,w= JqK f p ,,w
f p

is the limitation of the modal base to p: in other words, it is the smallest function
such that ∀w′ : f p(w′) = f (w′)∩ JpK f ,. So ‘if’-clauses have a very simple role:
namely, to restrict the modal base with their content. The crucial second step of the
15 The restrictor analysis was in fact developed in quite different ways in Kratzer 1981 and Kratzer
1986, respectively (see Schulz 2009 for helpful discussion). I focus on the first of these analyses here,
which I think is more promising. Very briefly, the reason for this is that the second analysis holds
that, at some level of logical form, conditionals actually have the structure ‘Modal(p)(q)’. What do
we say, then, about conditionals with complex consequents? It seems to me that this version of the
restrictor view faces the same objection just sketched against Stalnaker’s view.
16 I depart from Kratzer’s presentation slightly, to make the comparison with other approaches clearer.
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restrictor theory is to posit that the consequent of a conditional always contains a
modal. In particular, bare conditionals—conditionals which lack an overt modal or
conditional in their consequent—generally contain a covert ‘must’ with scope over
their consequent, with the semantics given here:
Kratzer ‘must’: JMust pK f ,,w= 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ MIN f ,,w : JpK f ,,w′ = 1
MIN f ,,w is the set of minimal worlds in f (w) according to (w).17 ‘Might’ is
treated as the dual of ‘must’, as usual. So ‘must’ says that all closest worlds are
p-worlds, and ‘might’ says that some closest world is a p-world. Putting this together
with Kratzer’s semantics for ‘if’, we get the following: ‘If p, q’ is true just in case all
the closest p-worlds are q-worlds (assuming there is a covert ‘must’ taking scope
over q). ‘If p, might q’ is true just in case some closest p-world is a q-world.
This approach avoids the objection raised above to Stalnaker’s approach: it has
no problem interpreting epistemic modals in situ in the consequents of conditionals.
In particular, sentences with the form ‘If p, might not p’ will never be (non-trivially)
true, since the domain of the epistemic modal will be restricted to p-worlds. But
Kratzer’s theory lands on the wrong side of the CEM vs. Duality debate. Again,
because ‘must’ and ‘might’ are duals, and because Kratzer assumes that bare condi-
tionals contain a covert ‘must’, Kratzer validates Duality: ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, might
not q’ are contradictories. And Kratzer invalidates CEM: since there can be more
than one closest p-world, it may be that some closest p-worlds are q-worlds and
some are q-worlds, in which case neither ‘If p, [must] q’ nor ‘If p, [must] not q’ will
be true (using brackets to indicate covert material).
But this vice of Kratzer’s theory is separable from the virtues of the restrictor
approach: we can give a simple variant which retains those virtues, while invalidating
Duality and validating CEM. The central idea is to keep Kratzer’s semantics for ‘if’,
but posit a different covert modal for bare conditionals: instead of ‘must’, we assume
bare conditionals contain a covert modal which selects a unique closest world. The
result matches Stalnaker’s theory for bare conditionals, but in a way which deals
more easily with overt modals.
17 I.e. the set of worlds w′ ∈ f (w) such that no world in f (w) is strictly better than w′ according to
(w).
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In more detail, we define a selection modal ‘σ ’ as follows; this generalizes
proposals for the semantics of ‘will’ given in Cariani & Santorio 2018, Kratzer In
Press.
(26) Jσ (p)K f ,,<,w=JpK f ,,<,MIN f ,<,w
f , (·), and <(·) are all defined as above, and MIN f ,<,w is the minimal world in the
well-order <(w) which is in f (w).18 Hence pσ (p)q on this semantics is true just in
case p is true at the closest world in the value of the modal base. We leave Kratzer’s
semantics for ‘if’, ‘must’, and ‘might’, unchanged (simply generalizing them all by
relativizing them to the well-order function).
The crucial change from Kratzer’s view is that in bare conditionals, rather
than assuming a covert ‘must’, we assume that a covert ‘σ ’ takes scope over the
consequent of the conditional. Assuming that the matrix modal base parameter is
uninformative (i.e., takes every world to the whole set of worlds), this has the result
that our truth conditions for bare conditionals coincide with Stalnaker’s: ‘If p, σ (q)’
is true just in case the closest p-world is also a q-world. We thus validate CEM: it
will always be the case that either ‘If p, [σ ] q’ is true or that ‘If p, [σ ] not q’ is true,
since the closest p-world will always be a q-world or a q-world. And, of course, we
invalidate Duality. ‘If p, q’ is true at w just in case the closest accessible p-world
to w according to <(w) is a q-world. ‘If p, might not q’ is true just in case, among
the closest accessible p-worlds to w according to (w), there is a q-world. Nothing
prevents both these conditions from obtaining at the same time.
But how do we account for the assertability and disagreement intuitions that
motivated Duality? Here we can give an account similar in spirit to Stalnaker’s, by
stipulating a connection between the order functions < and . In particular, we
can hold that for any world w and proposition p, the closest p-worlds according to
(w) are exactly those worlds which, for all the relevant evidence in w entails, are
the closest p-world according to <(w). In the non-conditional case, this predicts
that ‘might’ and ‘must’ quantify over all the worlds which are such that, for all the
relevant evidence entails, are the actual world, matching standard treatments (e.g.
Kratzer 1977, 1981). When ‘might’ appears in a conditional of the form ‘If p, might
q’, however, this will be felt to be a claim that, for all we know, the closest p-world
18 If f (w) is empty, then we stipulate MIN f ,<,w is λ , the absurd world.
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is a q-world. This straightforwardly accounts for the data motivating Duality, in
precisely the same way that Stalnaker does: ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, might not q’ will not
be co-assertable, and will be felt to be in disagreement, because the latter entails that
the relevant evidence leaves open that the closest p-world is a q-world, and thus that
the relevant evidence leaves open that the former is false.
Unlike Stalnaker’s approach, however, the present approach inherits all the
virtues of Kratzer’s restrictor analysis in its ability to interpret overt modals in situ,
avoiding the objection to Stalnaker’s account given above.
A final virtue of the present approach vis-à-vis the standard implementation of
the restrictor theory is that it accounts for intuitive differences between the meaning
of ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, must q’. Kratzer’s approach predicts these to be equivalent: the
latter simply makes overt what the former contains overtly. But the meaning of these
can diverge, as Rothschild 2013 notes (citing Benjamin Spector). Suppose that Mark
is holding a fair coin and then turns his back to us. Compare:
(27) [Jane:] If Mark flipped the coin, it landed heads.
(28) [Michael:] If Mark flipped the coin, it must have landed heads.
Suppose that Mark turns around and tells us that he did flip the coin, and it landed
heads. Then it seems clear that Jane spoke truly in asserting (27), even if it was just
a lucky guess; but Michael’s claim in (28) does not strike us as true. And so (27)
and (28) do not mean the same thing, pace Kratzer. By contrast, this divergence is
just what the present approach predicts, since on the one hand, ‘If p, q’ says that the
closest p-world is a q-world, while, on the other, ‘If p, must q’ says that the relevant
evidence entails that the closest p-world is a q-world. So, roughly, we predict that
(27) only says that the closest flip-world is a heads-world, while (28) says, moreover,
that this is known to be so: this predicts a difference in their meaning which seems
to match intuitions.
6 Stalnaker with local contexts
Assuming that bare conditionals contain a covert selection modal, rather than a
covert ‘must’, lets us marry what is attractive about the restrictor analysis—its ability
to make sense of overt modals in situ—with what is attractive about Stalnaker’s
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theory—validating CEM, not Duality. This is a step forward. But this approach has
several drawbacks which I want to highlight now.
First, this approach shares with the standard implementation of the restrictor
theory the peculiar assumption that conditionals which lack overt modals are always
saturated, at the level of logical form, with unpronounced covert modals. There is
something intuitively unsatisfying about this assumption. Reflecting on learnability
helps make this concern more acute. How do we learn to insert covert modals in all
the needed places? And how do we learn which modal to put in? We can imagine a
wide array of options that would seem to be open to children concerning what kind
of modal we put in (existential? universal? epistemic, deontic, metaphysical?) as
well as when to insert them (always? sometimes? never?). How do children (both
within and across languages) converge on the correct combination? The restrictor
theory must answer these difficult questions. Perhaps an answer can be given; but a
theory without covert modals would of course avoid this explanatory debt.
A second worry about this approach is that it shares with the restrictor theory
certain logical peculiarities concerning complex conditionals. Most worryingly, if
we agglomerate successive conditional antecedents in the manner of the restrictor
theory, we will invalidate the principle that conditionals of the form ‘If p, then p’
are always true. The basic issue is that, on restrictor theories, the interpretation of
conditionals depends on the content of the restriction (i.e., the content of the modal
base); and this can change within a sentence. So, in ‘If p, then p’, the second p is
interpreted relative to a different modal base than the first—namely, relative to one
restricted to p-worlds. But that means that, if p itself contains a conditional, then the
conditional can be interpreted differently in the two instances, and so ‘If p, then p’
can fail to be true. I spell this point out in more detail in Mandelkern 2018, 2019b.
The principle that ‘If p, then p’ is a logical truth seems to me very natural, and so
this concern strikes me as very serious for any restrictor-style theory, including the
present implementation.
A final concern about this approach comes from more general considerations
about epistemic modals. Exploration of the embedding behavior of epistemic modals
shows that they have restricted readings across the board, not just in the consequents
of conditionals (see e.g. Groenendijk et al. 1996, Aloni 2000, Yalcin 2007, Dorr &
Hawthorne 2013, Mandelkern 2019a). So, for instance, it looks like in a sentence
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of the form ‘p and might not p’, the ‘might’ is restricted to p-worlds, making such
sentences inconsistent. Evidence for this comes from the fact that sentences with
this form are not only incoherent (which might be explained on pragmatic grounds)
but also embed in incoherent ways, as when embedded under attitude predicates or
disjunction:
(29) #Suppose it’s not raining and it might be. Yalcin 2007
(30) #Either I won’t win but I might, or I won’t lose but I might. Mandelkern
2019a
It seems unlikely to me that the kind of modal restriction we find in sentences like
(29) and (30) is different in kind from the kind of modal restriction we find in
‘might’ conditionals. Further evidence that there is just one phenomenon here, not
two, comes from Santorio (2017)’s observation that ‘If p, q; and if p, might not q’
not only strikes us as incoherent, but also embeds incoherently, like conjunctions of
the form ‘p and might not p’:
(31) #Suppose, first, that the picnic will be cancelled if it rains; and, second, that
the picnic might not be cancelled if it rains.
This shows that simply predicting such conjunctions to be pragmatically incoherent,
as both Stalnaker’s wide-scoping view and our variation on the restrictor theory
do, misses something important about the relation between bare conditionals and
‘might’ conditionals.
With these points in mind, I want to return to Stalnaker’s theory of the con-
ditional, and explore the combination of that theory with a general theory of the
interpretation of embedded epistemic modals. As I argued above, Stalnaker’s wide-
scoping proposal about ‘might’ conditionals is not plausible in general; what I will
suggest here, following suggestions by Cian Dorr (p.c.), is that, given a suitably
sophisticated theory of epistemic modals—a theory I have motivated on independent
grounds elsewhere—we can in fact interpret epistemic modals in situ in Stalnaker’s
conditional.
Recall that a simple motivation for the wide-scoping route that Stalnaker proposes
is to account for the infelicity of sentences with the form ‘If p, might not p’. As
we saw above, the infelicity of such sentences is not straightforwardly explained
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by Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals. But, reflecting on sentences like (29) and
(30), this doesn’t look so surprising: in fact, the infelicity of sentences with the form
‘If p, might not p’ looks like an instance of a general pattern by which epistemic
modals get restricted by something like their local information. A general theory
of how epistemic modals are restricted by their local information may therefore be
able to account for the data in question while leaving ‘might’ in place. There are
different such theories on offer. Broadly speaking, we might try to account for this
behavior on pragmatic grounds, following Dorr & Hawthorne 2013; or on semantic
grounds, the route I advocate in Mandelkern 2019a. Since my sympathies are with
the latter route, that’s the one I’ll explore here, though the general picture that results
is compatible with a pragmatic implementation as well.19
The theory I give there, the bounded theory, starts with a standard modal account
of ‘might’ as an existential quantifier (essentially Kratzer’s account, but we can
simplify by eliminating the order function):20
Standard ‘might’: JMight pKκ, f ,w= 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ f (w) : JpKκ, f ,w′ = 1.
f is still a modal base; κ is a local context. Following Schlenker 2009, the local
context of a clause of a sentence is the unit of information which represents the
information already available for the interpretation of that clause: in other words,
whatever information you could add as a conjunct at that point in the sentence that
is guaranteed not to change the meaning of the sentence as a whole (see Schlenker
2009 for a more formal explication). More on local contexts in a moment; the
general details are not important for present purposes. The key idea for the purposes
of epistemic modals is that local contexts restrict epistemic modals’ domain of
quantification. In particular, epistemic modals presuppose that local context worlds
can access only local context worlds; I call this the locality constraint.
Bounded ‘might’: JMight pKκ, f ,w is defined iff ∀w′ ∈ κ : f (w′)⊆ κ;
where defined, true iff ∃w′ ∈ f (w) : JpKκ, f ,w′ = 1.
19 In Mandelkern 2019a, I argue that facts about order make trouble for pragmatic approaches, but those
issues are largely independent of present concerns.
20 In Mandelkern 2019a, I put modal bases into the object language; while that move is probably
necessary, it doesn’t matter for present purposes, so I keep a modal base in the index for simplicity.
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At a high level, this kind of restricting should look familiar: it is a lot like the kind
of restricting that Kratzer’s theory attributes to the antecedents of conditionals.
Crucially, however, this formulation is what is required in general to account for the
interpretation of epistemic modals in sentences like (29) or (30); see Mandelkern
2019a for much more extensive explication and motivation.
The question for the present is what this theory predicts in the context of Stal-
naker’s theory of the conditional. To answer that, we must ask what the local context
is for the consequent of a conditional given Stalnaker’s theory of the conditional.
Given Schlenker’s operationalization of the notion of local context, this amounts
to the question: what information can we add to the consequent of a conditional
which is guaranteed not to change the interpretation of the conditional, whatever
else goes there? One thing we can surely add is the information in the antecedent:
since we must evaluate the consequent at an antecedent-verifying world, adding the
antecedent as a conjunct to the consequent can’t possibly change the truth value of
the conditional (in other words: ‘If p, then q’ and ‘If p, then p and q’ are guaranteed
to be semantically equivalent, in Stalnaker’s theory). In fact, the local context for
the consequent ends up being the set of worlds which are closest antecedent worlds
according to some world in the global context.21 So, adding local contexts and modal
bases into Stalnaker’s theory, we have:
Stalnaker with local contexts: JIf p, qKκ, f ,<,w=JqK{MIN<(w′),p: w′∈κ}, f ,<,MIN<(w),p
Just to emphasize, although we are now representing local contexts explicitly, their
value is already determined by Stalnaker’s theory plus Schlenker’s algorithm for cal-
culating local contexts: importantly from the point of view of explanatory power, we
are not making any stipulations here, just applying a general algorithm to Stalnaker’s
semantic framework.
So let’s see what the combination of Stalnaker’s semantics with the bounded
theory of modality gets us. Think about a sentence with the form ‘If p, might not
p’ evaluated in a context c. The local context for the ‘might’ claim will be the set
of p-worlds treated as the closest p-world by some world in c. Furthermore, by
21 This sentence corrects a mistake in the published version of the paper pointed out by Sam Carter;
there I claim wrongly that the local context for the consequent is just the antecedent. That mistake is
inconsequential for the claims I make here, but important for extensions of this approach, for instance
for accounting for the infelicity of ‘If p, might not q’ in a context where ‘If p, q’ is accepted.
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Stalnaker’s semantics, we will evaluate the consequent at one of these p-worlds. By
the locality constraint of the bounded theory, this means that, at the world where
we evaluate the consequent, if the ‘might’-claim is well-defined, we will only be
able to access p-worlds from it. But by the core truth-conditions of ‘might’, that,
in turn, means that this sentence will be false. So sentences with this form will
always either be false or undefined, accounting for their infelicity. Importantly,
we account for their infelicity while leaving the ‘might’ in situ, which means we
avoid the objection I raised above to Stalnaker’s wide-scoping account. Finally, this
account straightforwardly accounts for the incoherence of ‘If p, q, and if p, might
not q’, whether embedded or not: given the left conjunct, the local context for the
consequent of the right conjunct will entail q, meaning the conjunction as a whole
cannot be both well-defined and true. Indeed, this explanation is exactly parallel to
the explanation the bounded theory gives of the incoherence of ‘p and might not p’,
in line with the intuition that these are two faces of the same problem.
7 Talking about worlds
Let me briefly review the dialectic to this point. Stalnaker’s theory validates CEM, but
it can’t plausibly interpret epistemic modals in situ in the consequents of conditionals,
given standard approaches to epistemic modals. Stalnaker proposed wide-scoping
epistemic modals to deal with this, but, as I’ve argued, this runs into trouble when we
have complex consequents. One way of responding to this is to take on the ideology
of the restrictor theory of conditionals, but hold that the restricted modal in bare
conditionals is not a ‘must’ but a selection modal. This lets us validate CEM while
keeping overt modals in situ. But precisely the flexibility which lets us switch from
a Duality to a CEM theory in the restrictor framework should give us pause: there
is too much flexibility here for this to be an explanatorily satisfying theory. What’s
more, restrictor theories in general, including this variant, have implausible logics.
Finally, this approach deals with epistemic modals in consequents of conditionals
in an ad hoc way, missing an important generalization about restricted readings of
epistemic modals across the board. By contrast, if we couple Stalnaker’s theory with
a more sophisticated approach to epistemic modals, like the bounded theory, we can
plausibly interpret epistemic modals in situ. We thus account for their interpretation
on the grounds of a general and independently motivated theory, one which also
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accounts for the incoherence of ‘If p, q and if p, might not q’ even when that
conjunction is embedded. We also avoid the logical perplexities that any variant on
the restrictor theory entails.
We thus avoid the latter two of the objections I raised above to my variant on
the restrictor theory. What about the first objection, about explanatory power? On
this front, it’s not immediately clear how much of an improvement the Stalnakerian
theory is. True, we don’t have to insert covert modals all over the place, but we
somehow have to know what kind of ordering to use in evaluating conditionals: if we
use anything other than a well-order, we won’t be guaranteed to have a unique closest
antecedent world, and we’ll end up with a very different picture—indeed, we’ll end
up with a CEM-invaliding theory like that of Lewis 1973. This is a particularly
worrisome issue, I think, because there are two vantage points from which that
alternative picture looks much more natural. The first is thinking of conditionals
fundamentally as tools for talking about orderings on worlds—the kind of picture
that comes out of Lewis 1973. For if you just reflect on what kind of similarity
relation is appropriate to worlds, ‘a well-order’ is not an intuitive reply. It’s very
natural to think that, even once you make clear which features of similarity you are
focusing on, we would still countenance at least ties in closeness among worlds
(if not more outré phenomena like infinite descending sequences); indeed, Lewis
(like others since) appealed to exactly that intuition when arguing against CEM.
Second, if we think of conditionals as fundamentally quantificational structures, as
the Kratzer/Lewis restrictor tradition does, CEM again looks unnatural: to obtain
CEM in a quantificational system, we’d have to have, in essence, quantification over
singleton sets, which is not common in natural language, if it exists at all.22
In this final section, I want to say something to try to assuage this explanatory
worry. Here is one picture of the functional role of conditionals. Following ideas
developed most explicitly in Schlenker 2004, 2006, we can think of conditionals as
referential structures:23 a conditional is a mechanism for talking about a particular
world—namely, the closest antecedent one. Non-conditional sentences let us talk
about the actual world; conditionals let us talk about particular (possibly non-actual)
22 See Schwarzschild 2002 for arguments it does exist.
23 Lewis (1973) likewise explores the application of his theory of conditionals to the nominal domain.
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worlds. The role of ‘if’-clauses is simply the one of focusing attention, not on the
actual world, but rather on the nearest antecedent-world.
Thinking about conditionals from the point of view of reference to worlds, rather
than similarity, helps with our explanatory worry. This is because there is evidence
that reference in general in natural language works with the mechanism of well-
orders. The standard way of modelling pronominal reference to individuals treats
pronouns as variables, whose value is determined by a variable assignment—which,
in turn, is just a well-order of individuals (as in e.g. Heim & Kratzer 1998). In more
recent, and more sophisticated, developments of systems of reference and anaphora,
sequences of individuals continue to play a central role, as in the dynamic tradition
growing out of Heim 1982 (see also e.g. Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991), Dekker
(1994)). In Dekker’s system in particular, the role of pronouns is (simplifying a bit)
to refer to the final (or penultimate, or antepenultimate, etc.) individual in a sequence
of individuals.24
From a formal point of view, thinking about conditionals as in the first instance
referential mechanisms might lead naturally to some changes to the formalism. For
instance, to bring out the analogy between reference to individuals and reference to
worlds, we could dispense with world parameters, and instead work directly with
well-orders on worlds, as in van Fraassen (1976)’s models of Stalnaker’s semantics.
We might in particular hold that, at the level of logical form, the consequents of
conditionals contain pronouns, overt or covert, which refer to worlds.25 If natural
language contains world variables/pronouns, we must say something about what to
do with unbound world variables. The natural, and standard, thing to say is that they
are always set to the world of evaluation. A different thing we could say, though, is
that they are always set to the minimal world in the salient ordering on worlds. We
could stipulate that the world of evaluation is always minimal in matrix orderings.
Conditional antecedents, however, would have the role of changing the ordering (if
necessary) to ensure that some antecedent-world is treated as minimal. These moves
24 Uncertainty about which individual is being talked about is represented using sets of sequences;
pronouns are then treated as projection functions over that set. At a high level, this looks a lot like a
semantic encoding of the supervaluationist approach to Stalnaker’s semantics.
25 See Partee 1973, 1984, Enç 1997, Stone 1997 for arguments that there is such pronominal reference
in general; Iatridou (1991) argues that ‘then’ is the overt realization of a world pronoun; see Fodor
(1970), Keshet (2008), von Fintel & Heim 2011: Ch. 8 for some different motivations for the idea
that natural language contains world variables.
26
Talking about worlds
would bring the parallel between Stalnaker’s theory and theories of nominal and
temporal anaphora even closer.
In short, then, if we start by thinking about conditionals as mechanisms we use
to talk directly about a given world—the closest antecedent world—a well-order
based theory like Stalnaker’s looks much more natural than if we start by thinking
about closeness orderings on worlds. Of course, this way of thinking does not force
well-orderings on us; we could think about conditional antecedents as denoting
pluralities of worlds, as Schlenker (2004) advocates in a similar framework; in that
case, CEM would be invalid. So the present way of thinking about conditionals still
leaves open the question of why reference to an individual world is the tack we in
fact take, rather than reference to a plurality of worlds. This strikes me, however,
as a fruitful question to ask from the point of view of theories of reference, rather
than theories of orderings on worlds in particular. If we start by thinking about
similarity orderings on worlds, well-orders seem like the last place we would end
up; if we start, rather, by thinking about reference to worlds, well-orders seem like
a very natural place to start. This approach allows us to then ask fruitful questions
about why we in fact default to singular rather than plural reference in the case of
worlds: Is there a general bias for individual rather than plural reference? If so, what
explains it? If not, what explains the phenomenon in the case of conditionals? It
also allows us to ask us about cases in which this default may be overridden. For
instance, generic conditionals like ‘If John goes to dinner, he stays for dessert’,
are much more plausibly analyzed as quantifying over cases in which John goes to
dinner, and do not seem to validate CEM (intuitively, it could well be that neither
that conditional nor its internal negation ‘If John goes to dinner, he doesn’t stay for
dessert’ is true, if, say, John stays for dessert half the time). A plural analysis of
these generic conditionals seems much more plausible than in the case of the kinds
of conditionals that we have focused on; from the present point of view, we can
ask what it is about these conditionals that selects for plural rather than singular
reference to worlds.
In short, then, while Stalnaker’s theory leaves explanatory questions open, those
questions seem much more tractable than the corresponding explanatory questions
for any version of the restrictor theory—provided, that is, that we think about
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conditionals as, in the first instance, tools for talking about possibly non-actual
worlds.
8 Conclusion
I have argued that credence judgments show that Duality is false, and provide further
support for CEM. I argued that the best CEM-friendly theory of the conditional,
however—namely Stalnaker’s theory, together with his assumption that epistemic
modals wide-scope—is not satisfying. I then presented two theories which validate
CEM but do not have trouble with overt modals. The first accomplishes this on a
parallel with Kratzer’s restrictor theory, but assumes that bare conditionals contain a
covert selection modal, rather than a covert ‘must’. The second combines Stalnaker’s
theory of the conditional with my bounded theory of epistemic modality. While
both of the resulting theories strike me as worth serious study, I have suggested that
the second theory is more promising, because it builds on a more general theory of
the interpretation of epistemic modals; has a more plausible logic; and has a better
explanation of what conditionals are: devices which allow us to talk about worlds—
not just the actual world, but also the world that would obtain if such-and-such were
the case.
I have left many questions open. Among these: first, I have not tried to account
for the differences between indicative and subjunctive conditionals (see e.g. Stal-
naker 1975, von Fintel 1998); this is a topic I take up in the present framework
in work in progress Mandelkern 2019b, where I also explore at greater length the
logic of restrictor theories of the conditional. Second, I have focused on the inter-
pretation of conditionals which are either bare, or contain overt epistemic modals
in their consequents. Even in this limited range, while I have addressed some core
challenges, I have left many questions unanswered; for instance, what exactly does
the accessibility relation for epistemic modals represent, particularly in subjunctive
conditionals? (It can’t in general be compatibility with the counterfactual evidence
of any people, since we can have subjunctives which take us to worlds where there
are no people at all.) Even more questions remain outside this range. For instance,
epistemic modals are not the only modals which have been claimed to have restricted
readings in the consequents of conditionals: deontic modals (see e.g. Frank 1996,
Geurts 2004, Khoo 2011) and adverbs of quantification (e.g. Lewis 1975) likewise
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seem to exhibit such behavior. This was, indeed, Lewis’s original motivation for a
restrictor-style theory. If we eschew such a theory, as I have suggested here, can we
nonetheless make sense of these readings? This requires careful further exploration.
Third, I have not tried to give a general account of judgments about the probabilities
of conditionals. The judgments that played a central role in my argument are pre-
dicted by my theory—first, since we invalidate Duality, we predict that credences in
‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, might not q’ need not sum to 1; second, since the disjunction of
‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, not q’ is a logical truth on my theory, their probabilities (as long
as they are disjoint) will sum to 1—both of which are in line with our observations
above. But more needs to be said about our judgments in general about the proba-
bilities of conditionals; here, again, we can hopefully appeal to the kind of general
considerations which have been put forward recently e.g. in Rothschild 2013, Bacon
2015, Khoo 2016 for making sense of these. Another option here, suggested by
the analogy I have drawn out between conditionals and individual reference, is to
build on van Fraassen (1976)’s models, which is one route to partially validating The
Thesis that probabilities of conditionals coincide with conditional probabilities (see
Stalnaker & Jeffrey 1994, Kaufmann 2009 for further developments).
A final set of questions comes out of my argument that Stalnaker’s theory of the
conditional fits naturally into a unified way of thinking about reference to individuals,
times, and worlds. I have drawn out some parallels across these domains, but there are
many questions of detail that this left unanswered, of the kind I sketched in the last
section. What is the best way of thinking about these referential mechanisms? Are
there underlying psychological processes that commonalities—and differences—
across these domains? These are questions that are, somewhat surprisingly, made
pressing by a detail in the semantics of the conditional: namely, the validity of
Conditional Excluded Middle.
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